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The Uniform Commercial Code Sales Article
Compared With West Virginia Law
(Conclusion)*
WILLARD D. LORENSEN**
Section 2-601. Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery.
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment
contracts (Section 2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the
sections on contractual limitations of remedy (Section 2-718 and 2-
719), if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to
conform to the contract, the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
In the main, this provision makes no significant change in
existing West Virginia law, though subsection (c) would help to
clarify the knotty problem of partial acceptance.
Two West Virginia cases which involved determinations of the
effect of a partial acceptance have reached conclusions in accord
with the commercial unit concept of subsection (c), but the most
recent decision on the point tends to run counter to this idea. In
Norman Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co.,' decided in 1925, the
buyer was not prejudiced in his rejection of four car loads of lumber
by his acceptance of other conforming carloads ordered under the
same contract. And in Regent Waist Co. v. 0. J. Morrison Dep't
Store Co.' the buyer's acceptance of part of an order of clothing
goods did not temper its right to reject a non-conforming part where
the price was readily apportionable. However, in Dixie Appliance
Co. v. Bourne... the buyer was held to have accepted all of an order
* This is the concluding article of a series of three on the Uniform Com-
mercial Code Sales Article. Previous portions appeared in the December and
February issues of the West Virginia Law Review.
** Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
260 100 W. Va. 515, 131 S.E. 12 (1925).
261 88 W. Va. 303, 106 S.E. 712 (1921).
262 138 W. Va. 810, 77 S.E.2d 879 (1953).
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of fourteen reels of cable by the acceptance of seven of the reels.
The Code provision here would not bar a rejection of a part of the
order simply because another part had been accepted, as it appears
that a single reel of cable could be treated as a commercial unit.
"Commercial unit" is defined in section 2-105 of the Code and
relies principally upon commercial usage."' What constitutes a
commercial unit could, in close cases, be a question of fact.
The comments to the present section state that a buyer does
not forfeit any remedy otherwise available to him by acceptance of
a non-conforming tender." 4 This rule would be most difficult to
draw from the language of this section alone, and fortunately it is
not necessary to do so. Section 2-607 states plainly that acceptance
of a non-conforming tender eliminates only the buyer's right to
reject that tender, thus the buyer's right to damages survives."'
Section 2-602. Manner and Effect of Rightful Rejection.
(1) Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after
their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably
notifies the seller.
(2) Subject to the provisions of the two following sections on
rejected goods (Sections 2-603 and 2-604),
(a) after rejection any exercise of ownership by the buyer
with respect to any commercial unit is wrongful as
against the seller; and
(b) if the buyer has before rejection taken physical posses-
sion of goods in which he does not have a security
2 63 Subsection (6) of U.C.C. § 2-105 provides as follows: "'Commercial
unit' means such a unit of goods as by commercial usage is a single whole
for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs its character
or value on the market or in use. A commercial unit may be a single article
(as a machine) or a set of articles (as a suite of furniture or an assortment
of sizes) or a quantity (as a bale, gross, or carload) or any other unit treated
in use or in the relevant market as a single whole."264 U.C.C. § 2-601, Comment 1.
265 Note that under § 2-206 a shipment of non-conforming goods con-
stitutes an acceptance to an offer unless the seller "seasonably notifies the
buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation to the buyer."
This provision precludes the possibility of the claim that the buyer's acceptance
of a non-conforming shipment is an acceptance of a counter-offer where the
seller did not communicate any acceptance to the buyer's original offer
independent of the shipment of the non-conforming goods.
1962]
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interest under the provisions of this Article (subsection
(3) of Section 2-711), he is under a duty after rejection
to hold them with reasonable care at the seller's disposi-
tion for a time sufficient to permit the seller to remove
them; but
(c) the buyer has no further obligations with regard to
goods rightfully rejected.
(3) The seller's rights with respect to goods wrongfully rejected
are governed by the provisions of this Article on Seller's remedies in
general (Section 2-703).
This provision ties together and lays the foundation for a series
of sections dealing with rejection and "revocation of acceptance."
There is nothing particularly new or different involved in this pro-
vision as relates to present West Virginia law' save the qualifying
phrases referring to other sections which would involve new sales
law rules in this state.2"'
Subsection (2) (c) makes it clear that a buyer has no obliga-
tions beyond those stated in the preceding subsection (viz., reason-
able care) where it could be argued under West Virginia law that
the buyer may have an additional obligation. In Ford v. Friedman,"6 8
a buyer rightfully rejected a shipment of shoes and notifed the seller
promptly of the rejection. The seller countered with an offer of
more favorable terms if the buyer would accept the shoes and the
buyer did not respond to this. Under these facts, the court held
that the buyer was deemed to have accepted the goods by his failure
to either (a) reject the seller's last offer or (b) return the goods.
In the many years that have elapsed since the Ford decision in
1895, it seems never to have been elsewhere seriously contended
that the buyer is under an obligation to return rightfully rejected
goods,2"9 and thus the Code provision which cuts off the buyer's
'
6 6 The general proposition that rejection must be accomplished within
a reasohable time and with seasonable notice is supported by: Great Eastern
Refining Corp. v. Shank, 99 W. Va. 101, 127 S.E. 922 (1925); Morgan-
Gardner Elec. Co. v. Beelick Knob Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 347, 112 S.E. 587
(1922); Ford v. Freedman, 40 W. Va. 177, 20 S.E. 930 (1895); Thompson
v. Douglas, 35 W. Va. 337, 13 S.E. 1015 (1891).
267 E.g. A merchant buyer is under no duty to resell any goods right-
fully rejected under present West Virginia law as compelled by § 2-603.
268 40 W. Va. 177, 20 S.E. 930 (1895).
2 69 In Morgan-Gardner Co. v. Beelick Knob Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 347,
112 S.E. 587 (1922), the buyer rightfully rejected goods sent and placed
it under protective cover, notifying the seller that the goods were held for
his disposal. This was held an effective rejection.
E Vol. 64
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obligations at reasonable care as provided in subsection (2) (b)
probably would effect no practical change in existing law in this state.
Section 2-603. Merchant Buyer's Duties as to Rightfully Rejected
Goods.
(1) Subject to any security interest in the buyer (subsection (3)
of Section 2-711), when the seller has no agent or place of business
at the market of rejection a merchant buyer is under a duty after
rejection of goods in his possession or control to follow any reasonable
instructions received from the seller with respect to the goods and in
the absence of such instructions to make reasonable efforts to sell
them for the seller's account if they are perishable or threaten to
decline in value speedily. Instructions are not reasonable if on
demand indemnity for expenses is not forthcoming.
(2) When the buyer sells goods under subsection (1), he is
entitled to reimbursement from the seller or out of the proceeds for
reasonable expenses of caring for and selling them, and if the
expenses include no selling commission then to such commission
as is usual in the trade or if there is none to a reasonable sum not
exceeding ten per cent on the gross proceeds.
(3) In complying with this section the buyer is held only to
good faith and good faith conduct hereunder is neither acceptance
nor conversion nor the basis of an action for damages.
There is no duty under present West Virginia law for a merchant
buyer to make reasonable efforts to sell rightfully rejected goods
under the circumstances outlined in this section. °70 Substantial pro-
270Two West Virginia cases involve the problem of the seller's plight
where perishable goods are sold to a buyer at a distant point. In Vaccaro
Bros. & Co. v. Farris, 92 W. Va. 655, 115 S.E. 830 (1923) it was held that
the trial court should have given a binding instruction in favor of the plaintiff
seller. The seller's evidence showed that bananas were shipped in "grass
green" condition from New Orleans and properly iced in railroad cars until
accepted by the defendant buyer while the cars were enroute. The defendant
buyer did not inspect the carload until about thirty-eight hours after it arrived
in South Charleston, West Virginia, and failed to show whether the car had
been iced after its arrival. When inspected, the bananas were too ripe for
wholesale marketing. In Mullins v. Farris, 100 W. Va. 540, 131 S.E. 6(1925) the court held that the evidence supported the jury verdict for the
seller that green beans shipped from Tennessee were in merchantable condi-
tion when shipped. The following quotation indicates a rather sympathetic
attitude towards the seller under these circumstances: "Defendant's instruction
1962 ]
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tection is presently afforded many shippers of perishables under
the federal Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930.27 '
But common law and the Sales Act still leaves some doubt as to the
rejecting buyer's right to resell to avoid further loss, and neither
viewed resale as a duty.272 The Code position, while affording pro-
tection to the buyer by reasonable limitations on his duty of resale,
broadens the protection even further by including not only perish-
ables but also other commodities which may decline rapidly in
value a73
Section 2-604. Buyer's Options as to Salvage of Rightfully Rejected
Goods.
Subject to the provisions of the immediately preceding section
on perishables if the seller gives no instructions within a reasonable
time after notification of rejection the buyer may store the rejected
goods for the seller's account or reship them to him or resell them
for the seller's account with reimbursement as provided in the
preceding section. Such action is not acceptance or conversion.
This section conforms to West Virginia law and changes by
a matter of degree the standard of care which must be used by
the rejecting buyer to resell the goods of the seller who has refused
to retake the goods.
No. 5, refused, would have told the jury that if, under the terms of purchase,
the d6fendant's were given the right to inspect the beans before acepting
[sic] them, and upon making such inspection their quality and quantity were
not as represented, then the defendants were entitled to reject them. The
instruction was properly refused. There is no evidence tending to support the
theory that the defendants were given the right of inspection before accepting
the goods."
271 46 Stat. 531 (1930); 7 U.S.C. §§ 499 (a) - (s) (1952).
272 See generally, Baker v. J. C. Watson Co., 64 Idaho 573, 134 P.2d
613 (1943). The difficulty arises from the act of resale appearing to be
.an act of ownership or dominion, thus an acceptance of the non-conforming
goods. Compare, Thompson v. Douglass, 35 W. Va. 337, 13 S.E. 1015 (1891)
where a buyer apparently rightfully rejected a carload of flour, notifying
the seller, but was held to have accepted and become liable for the price
because he permitted another, to whom he thought the seller had actually
intended to ship to goods, to remove the goods.
273 See Grainger Bros. Co. v. G. Amsinck & Co., 15 F.2d 329 (8th Cir.
1926). The Code comments do not elaborate upon the range of goods
intended to be covered by the phrase "threaten to decline in value speedily."
The range could be quite broad, e.g. seasonal clothing items, special holiday
candies, fad items, popular recordings, and the like.
264 E Vol. 64
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In Norman Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co.,274 the buyer
rightfully rejected four carloads of lumber and when the seller re-
fused to retake the lumber, the buyer resold them for the seller's
account. The standard which the buyer must meet according to the
Norman Lumber case was described by the court as "the utmost
diligence and good faith."275 The Code, by reference to the preceding
section demands only "good faith and good faith conduct" which
is a bit less demanding of a buyer who wishes to dispose of rejected
goods. The authority to store27 or return2 77 are recognized under
present West Virginia law.
Section 2-605. Waiver of Buyer's Objections by Failure to Par-
ticularize.
(1) The buyer's failure to state in connection with rejection a
particular defect which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection
precludes him from relying on the unstated defect to justify rejection
or to establish breach
(a) where the seller could have cured it if stated season-
ably; or
(b) between merchants when the seller has after rejection
made a request in writing for a full and final written
statement of all defects on which the buyer proposes
to rely.
(2) Payment against documents made without reservation of
rights precludes recovery of the payment for defects apparent on the
face of the documents.
This section would clarify an existing policy of West Virginia
law. In Linger v. Wilson,2"" the court summarized its ruling on this
274 100 W. Va. 515, 131 S.E. 12 (1925) (alternative holding). The
defendant buyer claimed seller's agent had authorized resale of rejected lum-
ber. The court agreed that such authority had no doubt been given, but
held that the buyer had such a right as a matter of law.2 75 Id. at 536, 131 S.E. at 16.
1
7 6 Morgan-Gardner Elec. Co. v. Beelick Knob Coal Co., 91 W. Va.
347, 112 S.E. 587 (1922).
277 Ford v. Friedman, 40 W. Va. 177, 20 S.E. 930 (1895).
27873 W. Va. 669, 80 S.E. 1108 (1914). Cf. E. L. Rice & Co. v. Roberts,
114 W. Va. 549, 172 S.E. 615 (1934).
19621
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point in the following terms: "When refusal to accept goods pur-
chased is based solely upon a particular objection, formally and
deliberately stated, all other objections are deemed waived."279 This
places a stricter burden on the rejecting buyer than the Code pro-
vision but does not state when, if ever, the buyer is under an obliga-
tion to make known his objections to the seller's tender. 8
Under the Code section, the merchant buyer automatically loses
his right to claim a rejection based on a curable defect28 ' by his
failure to state this reason, if such defect is ascertainable by a rea-
sonable inspection. Substantially, this was the situation posed in
the Linger case, though the syllabus point was not tempered by any
concern for the nature of the defect. 82 It should be noted also in
connection with subsection (1) (b) that the seller's demand for
a "full and final" statement of defects is qualified by the opening
language of the provision which obligates the buyer to report only
those defects which may be discovered by a reasonable inspection.28 3
Section 2-606. What Constitutes Acceptance of Goods.
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods
signifies to the seller that the goods are conforming or
that he will take or retain them in spite of their non-
conformity; or
279 1d. syllabus 1.
280In Gibson v. Adams & Tucker, 98 W. Va. 671, 127 S.E. 514 (1925)
the court relied on the buyer's failure to specify objections as an alternative
ground for reversing, on facts, a jury verdict for the defendant buyer. The
contract of sale permitted a one-day trial of a gasoline engine, at the end
of which the buyer was obligated to inform the seller of flaws in the engine
and buyer had the option to return if seller's mechanic could not correct
these flaws. The buyer kept the engine four months before making a demand
that the seller retake the engine, though intermediate objections to the per-
formance had been made. The court held that by retaining the engine and
using it for such a period, the buyer waived his right to reject, and noted
the one-day limit of the contract as an added reason for its conclusion.
Strict enforcement of the one-day provision could well be held an unconscion-
able provision. See U.C.C. § 2-302.
281 A curable defect is one that the seller could correct within the time
for performance. See U.C.C. § 2-208.282 Though the court does not specifically so state, it is inferrable that
the court ecognized the propriety of giving the seller an opportunity to cure
his tender. In the Linger case, note 278, supra, the tender was improper
because an amount of wheat in excess of that ordered was delivered.
283 See note 280, supra.
E Vol. 64266
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(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of
Section 2-602), but such acceptance does not occur
until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to
inspect them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership;
but if such act is wrongful as against the seller it is an
acceptance only i ratified by him.
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance
of that entire unit.
Numerous points bear mention in connection with this section,
but an accurate statement of what impact this section would have
is difficult because of the confused state of West Virginia law on
some points involved. Two points may be disposed of quickly. First,
this provision continues the Code concept of "commercial unit" and
permits acceptance or rejection to apply to commercial units within
a more encompassing transaction. West Virginia law on this matter
was discussed under Section 2-601. Second, subsection (1) (c)
poses a new twist in acceptance by exercise of dominion not pres-
ently found in West Virginia law. While it has been recognized in
this state that the exercise of dominion may constitute acceptance,2 84
no case has ever posed the question of whether a seller may refuse
to acknowledge such "acceptance" when it is wrongful as to him.
For example, a buyer who rightfully rejects a tender of goods by
adequate notice to the seller, may subsequently find that it would
be advantageous to take the non-conforming goods. Such a situa-
tion could arise, for example, where a strike suddenly caused a
shortage of the kind of goods involved. Once rejected, the buyer's
exercise of dominion over the goods is wrongful as to the seller.
If the value of these goods suddenly rises, the buyer disposes of
the goods at an inflated price, the seller, under the Code provision
could treat this as a conversion and fix his damages by the value
of the goods at the time of the buyer's wrongful exercise of dominion,
rather than an acceptance which limits his recovery to the contract
price.
The most significant change in present law could result from
subsection (1) (b) and the general policy which it reflects. Other
284 Thompson v. Douglass, 35 W. Va. 337, 13 S.E. 1015 (1891).
1962 ]
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 3 [1962], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol64/iss3/3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Code provisions bearing upon acceptance help give a meaning to
this provision which runs contrary to what is apparently the law in
West Virginia, but there is no unequivocal language of change con-
tained in the provision. The important point in the subsection is
that it stresses that acceptance by failure to reject does not occur
until there has been a reasonable opportunity to inspect. Super-
ficially at least, it could be said that this view has been embraced by
the law of this state. Note the following language from Kemble v.
Wiltison:85
"[W]here the seller of personal property has expressly warranted
it, the buyer, upon delivery of the property to him, even though
the title has passed and vested in him, may rescind the con-
tract upon discovering that the warranty has been broken, pro-
vided he acts promptly and does not so use the property as to
indicate that he unequivocally accept it in satisfaction of the
contract."
286
The court said that the buyer had the right to rescind here even
though the price had been paid, the buyer had actual possession of
the goods involved for several days and had put the goods to use.
What leaves lingering doubts about the compatibility of the
Code policy and existing West Virginia law are two prior cases and
the court's reluctance to temper their holdings. Each of these cases
involved attempts by buyers to reject after they discovered the goods
to be non-conforming, but in each case the court apparently took
the view that the "reasonable opportunity for inspection" had passed.
Thus existing West Virginia law apparently takes a very narrow
view of what is a reasonable opportunity to inspect, one that is much
narrower than that which the Code contemplates.
The first of these unsettling decisions is Eagle Glass & Mfg.
Co. v. Second Hand Pipe & Supply Co.287 There the seller war-
ranted its pipe to be capable of withstanding a certain pressure
and the buyer, after laying pipe in a line, claimed that the pipe
failed to withstand a much lesser pressure. The buyer dug up the
pipe and rejected it. The court apparently viewed the manner of
testing employed as unreasonable:
"Plaintiff accepted the greater part of the pipe delivered, and
used the material for the purpose for which it was purchased-
28592 W. Va. 32, 114 S.E. 369 (1922).1861d. at 40, 114 S.E. at 372.
287 74 W. Va. 228, 81 S.E. 976 (1914).
E Vol. 64
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the laying of a pipe line. Plaintiff converted the pipe to its
own use. . . If when delivery of the pipe was tendered,
plaintiff had tested it and found that it did not conform to
the warranty, plaintiff could have rejected it-could have re-
fused to become the owner of it.... 288
The nature of the test employed here was much the same as that
in the Kemble case which was decided later-a use test. In one the
court said this was proper, in the other, improper. The court
ventured this wholly unsatisfactory distinction of the Eagle Glass
case in -the Kemble opinion:
"A reading of the opinion in that case, however, clearly shows
that not only had the title passed, but that the buyer had used
the property in his business, and did not make any effort to
rescind or return the property when he discovered the breach
of the warranty, and that was' the real ground upon which
the decision was based.... 28 9
But the statement of facts appearing in the Eagle Glass case shows
that the buyer dug up the pipe as soon as it proved incapable of
withstanding the pressure and returned it to the railroad siding where
it had been received. 9' The reluctance to recognize the conflict be-
tween Kemble and Eagle Glass leaves the reasonableness of a use
test very much in doubt.
Another prior decision not mentioned in the Kemble case strong-
ly supports the view of the Eagle Glass case. This is American Sugar
Refining Co. v. Martin Nelly-Grocery Co.291 There a wholesale
buyer of groceries sought to reject a shipment of sugar after it re-
ceived complaints from customers that the sugar was not of the
quality that the wholesaler's contract demanded. The court said,
"The fact that the sugar was in bags does not preclude inspection
or relieve from the duty to inspect.' 292 This view is highly im-
practical today where packaging is such an important aspect of
merchandising goods. The buyer apparently must either break the
288 1d. at-230, 81 S.E. at 977.
289 92 -W. Va. at 40, 114 S.E. at 372.
29074 W. Va. at 229, 81 S.E. at 976: "Thereupon plaintiff took up the
line and returned the pipe to defendant at the railroad station from which
plaintiff had received it. .. ."
291 90 W. Va. 730, 111 S.E. 759 (1922).
292 Id. at 734, 111 S.E. at 369.
196:21
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package and make a thorough inspection or run the risk of being
saddled with non-conforming goods.293
Three points indicate that the Code would relax the Eagle Glass
and American Sugar decisions. First, subsection (1) (b) of the
present section stresses that failure to reject becomes acceptance
only after there has been a reasonable opportunity for inspection.
Second, the provision relating to rejection requires that it must occur
within a "reasonable time" after the delivery-it does not require
rejection to be immediate or prompt.294 Third, the Code permits
acceptance to be revoked under certain circumstances in section
2-608-further recognition of the fact that the buyer's reasonable
opportunity for discovery of non-conformity may not occur until
some time after the actual delivery of the goods. Revocation of ac-
ceptance, of course, does not become an issue until there has been
an acceptance. And acceptance by a failure to reject does not occur,
under the Code view until there has been a reasonable opportunity
to inspect.
Section 2-607. Effect of Acceptance; Notice of Breach; Burden of
Establishing Breach After Acceptance; Notice of
Claim or Litigation to Person Answerable Over.
(1) The buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods
accepted.
(2) Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of
the goods accepted and if made with knowledge of a non-conformity
cannot be revoked because of it unless the acceptance was on the
reasonable assumption that the non-conformity would be seasonably
cured but acceptance does not of itself impair any other remedy
provided by this Article for non-conformity.
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered any breach notify the
seller of breach or be barred from any remedy; and
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (sub-
section (3) of Section 2-312) and the buyer is sued as
293 Note that West Virginia has adopted the "sealed container" exception
to the usual rule of implied warranty of merchantability which recognizes
the fact that a merchant purchasing goods in sealed containers has no way
of determining the quality of the goods in those containers. See, Pennington
v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 117 W. Va. 680, 186 S.E. 610 (1936).294 See U.C.C. § 2-602.
[ Vol. 64
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a result of such a breach he must so notify the seller
within a reasonable time after he receives notice of
the litigation or be barred from any remedy over for
liability established by the litigation.
(4) The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with
respect to the goods accepted.
(5) Where the buyer is sued for breach of a warranty or other
obligation for which his seller is answerable over
(a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation.
If the notice states that the seller may come in and
defend and if the seller does not do so he will be
bound in any action against him by his buyer by any
determination of fact common to the two litigations,
then unless the seller after seasonable receipt of the
notice does come in and defend he is so bound.
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (sub-
section (3) of Section 2-312) the original seller may
demand in writing that his buyer turn over to him con-
trol of the litigation including settlement or else be
barred from any remedy over and if he also agrees to
bear all expenses and to satisfy any adverse judgment,
then unless the buyer after seasonable receipt of the
demand does turn over control the buyer is so barred.
(6) The provisions of subsections (3), (4) and (5) apply to any
obligation of a buyer to hold the seller harmless against infringement
or the like (subsection (3) of Section 2-312).
This provision covers a wide range of points, many of which
are unresolved under existing West Virginia case law. At those points
where present law does give some direction, it is consistent with
that of the present section.
Subsection (1) requiring that the buyer pay the contract rate
for goods accepted states a rule that is assumed by numerous West
Virginia decisions. Subsection (2) makes it clear that acceptance
bars only the right of rejection, but leaves other remedies unaffected.
In Schaffner v. National Supply Co.,295 the seller maintained that
295 80 W. Va. 111, 92 S.E. 580 (1917).
196Z I
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the buyer's right to damages for the failure of the goods to conform
to the contract was barred by the buyer's acceptance of the goods.
This view was rejected and the court permitted recovery of dam-
ages where the buyer accepted the goods unaware of the non-
conformity. And in Hayssen Mfg. Co. v. Moot 2 96 the buyer was
permitted to recover damages even though the wrapping machine
involved in the sale failed to operate properly from the outset. The
fact that the seller continued to attempt to put the machine in proper
condition with the cooperation of the buyer excused the buyer from
rejecting the machine for known deficiencies or waiving his right to
damages. Thus, the principles stated in subection (2) are presently
recognized in this state.
Before the coming of the Uniform Sales Act, a division of
authority developed in this country as to whether implied warranties
survived acceptance of the goods by the buyer. 9 The case of Morse
v. Moore2 98 became the leading authority for the moderate view
that such warranties did survive acceptance, but the case emphasized
the obligation of the buyer to give reasonably prompt notice to the
seller of the breach. This latter view was adopted in the Uniform
Sales Act299 and much litigation has developed around the reason-
ableness of notices given."' 0 West Virginia adopted the Morse v.
Moore rule in Schaffner v. National Supply Co."0' but the question
of reasonableness of notice has never become a significant issue in
any case in this state. The Code section provides in subsection (3)
(a) that such notice must be given. This conforms to a more or
less implicit requirement of existing law in this state.
The concern of subsection (3) (b) and subsection (5) with
the rights and obligations as between buyer and seller where the
buyer is subjected to litigation by a third party is presently not cov-
ered by West Virginia law.
Subsection (4) states the standard rule that establishing a breach
as to accepted goods is the burden of the buyer." 2
296 116 W. Va. 204, 179 S.E. 301 (1935).
297 3 WILLiSTON, SALEs §§ 488, 489 (rev. ed. 148).
29883 Me. 473, 22 AUt. 362 (1891).2 99 Uriwom SALES AcT § 49.
I00 See, Annot. 53 A.L.R.2d 270 (1957).
301 80 W. Va. 111, 92 S.E. 580 (1917). The Schaffner case dealt with
a breach of a warranty of description which is presently characterized as an
implied warranty.
302 See, e.g. Grand Rapids Show Case Co. v. Earle Rogers Co., 103 W. Va.
64, 736 S.E. 602 (1927).
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Section 2-608. Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part.
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or com-
mercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value
to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity
would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured;
or
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his accept.
ance was reasonably induced either by the difficulty
or discovery before acceptance or by the seller's as.
surances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable
time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground
for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods
which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until
the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with
regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.
Revocation of acceptance is a new concept introduced by the
Code. It would be new to West Virginia and would liberalize the
remedies available to a buyer who has received non-conforming
goods. It would also help to avoid a continued source of confusion
which arises from the treatment of a rejection of goods under some
circumstances as a "recission" of some sort.
Under present law, once goods are accepted, the buyer cannot
"rescind" but must rely solely upon his remedy for breach.' As
noted under the discussion of section 2-606, Kemble v. Wiltison'04
opened the door a bit for the buyer under such circumstances, per-
mitting the buyer there to "rescind" though he had taken physical
possession of the goods involved and exercised dominion over them.
Return of the goods was permissible there, the court said, because
3
0 3 Dixie Appliance Co. v. Bourne, 138 W. Va. 810, 77 S.E.2d 879
(1952); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Martin-Nelly Grocery Co., 90 W. Va,
730, 111 S.E. 759 (1922); Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Second Hand Pipe &
Supply Co., 74 W. Va. 228, 81 S.E. 976 (1914); J. W. Ellison, Son & Co.
v. Flat Top Grocery Co., 69 W. Va. 380, 71 S.E. 391 (1911).304 92 W. Va. 32, 114 S.E. 369 (1922).
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the only use made of the goods was a testing of them.'" In the
context of prior cases, the use of goods not solely consonant with
a test is usually considered an exercise of dominion which amounts
to acceptance and thus bars any subsequent attempt to return the
goods.30 6 Thus, if a retail grocer gets a bad batch of canned goods
and he can discover this only upon the complaints of his customers
who have opened various cans purchased, the grocer is precluded
from returning the remaining goods and "rescinding" under present
law. The Code provision here would, contrawise, permit him to
revoke his acceptance. It would not saddle him with a money re-
covery that may be inadequate and with the troublesome chore of
disposing of non-conforming goods."'7
In the discussion of this section and of section 2-606 the word
recission has been tucked between quotation marks because its use
in connection with the rejection of goods under a sales transaction
is misleading. The confusion which is invited by the use of that
term in this context may be shown by a few lines from the opinion
in American Sugar Refining Co. case, ' 8 where the buyer attempted
to reject, belatedly, a shipment of non-conforming sugar:
"It is well settled in this state that where the contract is ex-
ecuted, and warranty is relied upon, recission cannot be had.
. ..The plea being one setting up recission, cannot be good
as a pleas for breach of warranty. If there was a recission, then
there was no contract in existence ...." (Emphasis added.) 01
305 In describing the buyer's right to rescind in the Kemble case, supra
note 304, the court concluded with the following phrase, id. at 40, 114 S.E.
at 273: "[P]rovided he [the buyer] act promptly and does not so use the
property as to indicate that he has unequivocally accepted it in satisfaction
of the contract . . ."306 In American Sugar Refining Co. v. Martin-Nelly Grocery Co., 90
W. Va. 730, 111 S.E. 759, (1922) the wholesaler buyer of the sugar involved
apparently did not learn of the non-conforming of the sugar delivered until
he received complaints from customers who had opened the sacks containing
the sugar. Even after this time the buyer made a payment, claiming this
was done under the assumption the seller would make a proper adjustment.
Note the parallel of the -buyer's position here and subsection (1) (a) of the
present section.3o7 In Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Second Hand Pipe & Supply Co., 74
W. Va. 228, 81 S.E. 976 (1914) the court noted that used pipe attempted to
be returned by the buyer had some value which should be off-set against
the buyer's recovery for non-conformity of the goods. Disposing of such
material without undue loss can be a serious problem where the business
firm or individual involved is not in contact with the market for such goods.
Storage and proper preservation of goods could be a troublesome problem
to the buyer left with non-conforming goods.
308 90 W. Va. 730, 111 S.E. 759 (1922).309Id., at 734, 111 S.E. at 761.
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The buyer who wants to reject non-conforming goods, be it at the
time they are first tendered, or be it at a later time when a latent
and substantial defect first comes to his notice, is deprived of a part
of the benefit of his bargain. The Code provision would afford him
the opportunity of returning the non-conforming goods, wiping out
his obligation to pay the price and retain for him any other remedy
the law affords to one who has suffered by another's failure to
perform a promised obligation.
Section 2-609. Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance.
(1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party
that the other's expectation of receiving due performance will not
be impaired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with
respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing
demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives
such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any per-
formance for which he has not already received the agreed return.
(2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for in-
security and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be deter-
mined according to commercial standards.
(3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not
prejudice the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate assurance
of future performance.
(4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide
within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of
due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of the
particular case is a repudiation of the contract.
This section would introduce a new principle into West Virginia
law. It is based on the idea that the business man bargains for more
than "a promise plus a right to win a law suit."31
West Virginia presently recognizes the right of a seller to
suspend performance in two narrow situations-in the case of the
31 0U.C.C. § 2-609.
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seller's lien"' and the seller's right to stop goods in transit." 2 Both
these rights of the seller reflect a concern for the seller's reasonable
expectancy that he is going to be paid for the goods sold. Note in
these situations that the title to the goods has passed to the buyer,
but the seller is permitted to continue to exercise control over them
to assure himself some security for receiving the purchase price. The
Code provision here expands this same concern to all phases of
the sales transaction and doesn't limit it only to the seller who be-
comes concerned with his buyer's solvency. The buyer may become
equally concerned about the seller's ability to furnish conforming
goods. For example, if a building contractor has agreed to purchase
all his lumber supplies from a certain seller and he learns that the
seller of late has frequently been making non-conforming deliveries
to other contractors, the builder may demand adequate assurance
from his seller that conforming deliveries will be made to protect
himself from delays in his work schedules.
The broad thrust of this provision would be new. It is essentially
a generalization of a right now narrowly recognized in the instance
of the seller who has reasonable grounds to fear his buyer's ability
to pay the purchase price.
Section 2-610. Anticipatory Repudiation.
When either party repudiates the contract with respect to a
performance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair
the value of the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance
by the repudiating party; or
(b) resort to any remedy for breach (Section 2-703 or Sec-
tion 2-711), even though he has notified the repudiating
party that he would await the latter's performance and
has urged retraction; and
(c) in either case suspend his own performance or proceed
in accordance with the provisions of this Article on the
311 Rine & Lynch v. Ireland Lumber Co., 86 W. Va. 114, 103 S.E. 452
(1920).
3'2Sharp v. Campbell, 189 W. Va. 526, 109 S.E. 611 (1921). Note
that the right of stoppage in transit was recognized in the Sharp case but its
use there was denied because there was no showing of insolvency on the
part of the buyer.
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seller's right to identify goods to the contract notwith-
standing breach or to salvage unfinished goods (Section
2-704.)
West Virginia has recognized the doctrine of anticipatory breach
or repudiation of a contract, 3' but present case law in this state
does not spell out the variety of remedies available to the aggrieved
party as does this Code provision. " 4
The remedies available to the aggrieved party are broadened,
but discussion of this point is taken up under the sections specifically
bearing on remedies.
Section 2-611. Retraction of Anticipatory Repudiation.
(1) Until the repudiating party's next performance is due he
can retract his repudiation unless the aggrieved party has since the
repudiation cancelled or materially changed his position or otherwise
indicated that he considers the repudiation final.
(2) Retraction may be by any method which clearly indicates
to the aggrieved party that the repudiating party intends to perform,
but must include any assurance justifiably demanded under the
provisions of this Article (Section 2-609).
(3) Retraction reinstates the repudiating party's rights under
the contract with due excuse and allowance to the aggrieved party
for any delay occasioned by the repudiation.
West Virginia has recognized the right of the repudiating party
to retract his repudiation," 5 but the cases seem to indicate that the
aggrieved party is more limited in his powers to cut off this right
than the Code provision allows.
313 Pancake v. George Campbell Co., 44 W. Va. 82, 28 S.E. 719 (1897);
Davis v. Grand Rapids School-Furniture Co., 41 W. Va. 717, 24 S.E. 630(1895). See generally W. VA. ANNOTATIONS TO RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
(1938) and Riley, The Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach as Applied in West
Virginia, 31 W. VA. L. Q. 182 (1925).
314 The principle cases cited in note 313, supra, both involved the question
of whether suit could be brought before time for performance had elapsed.3 15 Swiger v. Haymen, 56 W. Va. 123, 48 S.E. 839 (1904).
1962 ]
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 3 [1962], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol64/iss3/3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Repudiation comes too late, under the Code view, if it occurs
after (1) time for performance has passed; (2) the aggrieved party
has changed his position; (3) the aggrieved party has cancelled;" 6
or (4) the aggrieved party has otherwise indicated that he considers
the repudiation as final. No doubt West Virginia would be in accord
on points (1) and (2), but it is questionable that present law is
in accord with the latter two ways in which the right to repudiate
is terminated. This is an open question in this state, and the Code
provision would establish a rule very liberal to the aggrieved party.
In Swiger v. Hayman,"' the court made this note of the effect of
the retraction:
"The [aggrieved] . . . parties took no step whatever in conse-
quence of his renunciation. Their situation was not changed
or altered in the least, and they did not signify by word or act
what their wishes or purposes were, what interpretation they
put upon the language and conduct of [the repudiating party]
... nor what they intended to do, until after he had retracted,
and then it was too late. ...
However, in Bannister v. Victoria Coal & Coke Co.,'19 the court
attributed32 the following statement to Judge Poffenbarger in the
Swiger case and relied upon it heavily: "To work a release a re-
fusal to perform must be a distinct and unequivocal absolute refusal
to perform the promise, and must be treated and acted upon as such
by the party to whom the promise is made."132' If the repudiation
must be both treated and acted upon as a repudiation, then the Code
indeed liberalizes the aggrieved party's rights.
Section 2-612. "Installment Contract"; Breach.
(1) An "installment contract" is one which requires or authorizes
the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, even
316 "Cancellation" is defined in § 2-106 of the Code as that which "puts
an end to the contract for breach by the other...." The definition is ven-
tured there to distinguish "termination" which is putting an end to a contract
for some reason other than breach by the other party. The definition has no
significant bearing on what acts are necessary to "cancel" and presumably
mere notification would be sufficient.
317 56 W. Va. 123, 48 S.E. 839 (1904).
318 ld. at 127, 48 S.E. 841.
319 63 W. Va. 502, 61 S.E. 338 (1908).
320 Judge Poffenbarger was quoting from a Supreme Court report which
was in turn quoting from Benjamine's treatise on sales.
321 63 W. Va. at 510, 61 S.E. at 341 (1908).
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though the contract contains a clause "each delivery is a separate
contract" or its equivalent.
(2) The buyer may reject any installment which is non-con-
forming if the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that
installment and cannot be cured or if the non-conformity is a defect
in the required documents; but if the non-conformity does not fall
within subsection (3) and the seller gives adequate assurance of its
cure the buyer must accept that installment.
(3) Whenever non-conformity or default with respect to one
or more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole
contract there is a breach of the whole. But the aggrieved party
reinstates the contract it he accepts a non-conforming installment
without seasonably notifying of cancellation or if he brings an action
with respect only to past installments or demands performance as
to future installments or demands performance as to future install-
ments.
Present West Virginia law is in general accord with this section,
but the provision would add certainty beyond the known limits of
present case law.
The general policy of the Code on installment contracts is
fairly well expressed in the first sentence of subsection (3)-a
failure to perform in conformity with the contract as to one install-
ment must substantially impair the value of the whole before there
is a breach of the whole contract.1
22
The definition of an installment contract in subsection (1) is
rather broad. The term is not explicitly defined presently in West
Virginia law. It should be noted that contract clauses which attempt
to remove an installment transaction from the usual rules of breach
applicable to such transactions are made ineffective by subsection
(1). Thus, the comments to the section state:
"Even where a clause speaks of 'a separate contract for
all purposes', a commercial reading of the language under
the section on good faith and commercial standards requires
that the singleness of the document and the negotiation, to-
322 Accord, J. W. Ellison, Son & Co. v. Flat Top Grocery Co., 69 W. Va.
380, 71 S.E. 391 (1911).
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gether with the sense of the situation, prevail over any un-
commercial and legalistic interpretation." 2 '
Subsections (2) and (3) state with some added precision and
details rules presently applicable to individual non-conforming in-
stallments and breach of the whole contract.324
Section 2-613. Casualty to Identified Goods.
Where the contract requires for its performance goods identified
when the contract is made, and the goods suffer casualty without fault
of either party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer, or in
a proper case under a "no arrival, no sale" term (Section 2-324) then
(a) if the loss is total the contract is avoided; and
(b) if the loss is partial or the goods have so deteriorated
as no longer to conform to the contract the buyer may
treat the contract as avoided or accept the goods with
due allowance from the contract price for the deteriora-
tion or the deficiency in quantity but without further
right against the seller.
No direct West Virginia authority is found on this point.3 2
Where destruction of goods without fault is involved, the case usually
arising is a suit by the seller for the purchase price under the theory
that the title and risk of loss passed to the buyer upon the making
of the contract.326
3 2 3 U.C.C. § 2-612, Comment 3.3 24 McMullar Coal Co. v. Champion Coated Paper Co., 103 W. Va. 637,
138 S.E. 755 (1927). (Court held continued acceptance and use of non-
conforming installments barred buyer from declaring breach on another non-
conforming shipment-generally supporting the view that past practice of
buyer showed non-conformity of degree involved did not substantially impair
the value of the entire contract.) See generally: J. W. Ellison, Son & Co.
v. Flat Top Grocery Co., note 322, supra (money allowance made for prior
non-conforming installments, buyer could not refuse money allowance on
present installment and treat-it as breach of the whole contract); Raleigh
Lumber Co. v. William A. Wilson & Son, 69 W. Va. 598, 72 S.E. 651 (1911).(Seller's refusal to cure first non-conforming shipment justified cancellation
of whole contract.)
325 The general contract law principle that frustration of the object of
a contract without fault avoids the contract has been recognized in this state,
Ravenswood, S. & G. Ry. v. Town of Ravenswood, 41 W. Va. 732, 24 S.E.
597 (1896). The Uniform Sales Act adopted this general principle in §§
7 and 8.
326 E.g. Morgan v. King, 28 W. Va. 1 (1886).
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Section 2-614. Substituted Performance.
(1) Where without fault of either party the agreed berthing,
loading, or unloading facilities fail or an agreed type of carrier
becomes unavailable or the agreed manner of delivery otherwise
becomes commercially impracticable but a commercially reasonable
substitute is available, such substitute performance must be tendered
and accepted.
(2) If the agreed means or manner of payment fails because of
domestic or foreign governmental regulation, the seller may with-
hold or stop delivery unless the buyer provides a means or manner
of payment which is commercially a substantial equivalent. If
delivery has already been taken, payment by the means or in the
manner provided by the regulation discharges the buyer's obligation
unless the regulation is discriminatory, oppressive or predatory.
No West Virginia authority is found on the points covered by
this provision.
Section 2-615. Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions.
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation
and subject to the preceding section or substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part
by a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c)
is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale
if performance is agreed has been made impracticable
by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence
of which was a basic assumption on which the contract
was made or by compliance in good faith with any
applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation
or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect
only a part of the seller's capacity to perform, he must
allocate production and deliveries among his customers
but may at his option include regular customers not
then under contract as well as his own requirements
for further manufacture. He may so allocate in any
manner which is fair and reasonable.
1962 ]
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(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there
will be delay or non-delivery and, when allocation is
required under paragraph (b), of the estimated quota
thus made available for the buyer.
Failure of presupposed conditions would probably be more
easily recognized for what it is if the word "impossibility" were
slipped into the provision somewhere. The word is not used but
the present section is an outgrowth of the developing doctrine of
excuse from performance by "impossibility." The modem trend in
contract law is to treat of this problem in terms of "impracticability"
and not "impossibility"327 and so goes the Code provision. What's
more, the comments to the Code provision emphasize that it is
"commercial impracticability" that is significant.328 The West Vir-
ginia law in this area has been thoroughly reviewed with the con-
clusion that actual case results in this state reflect fairly well the
rather liberal view of the Restatement of Contracts,329 though lan-
guage in certain court opinions indicates a stricter application of
the "impossibility" doctrine obtains. 3 ' The Code provision is prob-
ably in accord with the actual results of decided West Virginia cases.
The provisions for allocation, notice, and the like, which round
out the Code provision have no counterpart under existing authority
in this state.
Section 2-616. Procedure on Notice Claiming Excuse.
(1) Where the buyer receives notification of a material or
indefinite delay or an allocation justified under the preceding section
he may by written notification to the seller as to any delivery con-
cerned, and where the prospective deficiency substantially impairs
the value of the whole contract under the provisions of this Article
relating to breach of installment contracts (Section 2-612), then
also as to the whole,
32 7 PASTTEME , CoNTcrcTs § 454 (1932).
U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 3.32 9 See Colson, The Excuse of Impossibility in West Virginia Contract
Law, 48 W. VA. L. Q. 189 (1942).
330 E.g. "It is a well settled rule of law, that if a party by his contract
charge himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he must make
it good, unless its performance is rendered impossible by the act of God,
the law or the other party. Unforeseen difficulties, however great, will not
excuse him.. . ." McCormick v. Jordon, 65 W. Va. 86, 90, 63 S.E. 778, 779
(1909).
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(a) terminate and thereby discharge any unexecuted por-
tion of the contract; or
(b) modify the contract by agreeing to take his available
quota in substitution.
(2) If after receipt of such notification from the seller the buyer
fails so to modify the contract within a reasonable time not exeeding
thirty days the contract lapses with respect to any deliveries affected.
(3) The provisions of this section may not be negated by agree-
ment except in so far as the seller has assumed a greater obligation
under the preceding section.
This provision has no counterpart in present West Virginia law.
It would establish standards to be followed where excuse is claimed
under the preceding section. Notice that the cut off or wiping out
of the contract here is termed a "termination" and not a "cancella-
tion." The distinction between these terms is pointed out in section
2-106.
Section 2-701. Remedies for Breach of Collateral Contracts Not
Impaired.
Remedies for breach of any obligation or promise collateral
or ancillary to a contract for sale are not impaired by the provisions
of this Article.
Part seven of the sales article deals with remedies generally.
This section limits the application of this part of the sales article
and has no counterpart of course in existing West Virginia law.
Section 2-702. Seller's Remedies on Discovery of Buyer's Insol-
vency.
(1) Where the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he
may refuse delivery except for cash including payment for all
goods theretofore delivered under the contract, and stop delivery
under this Article (Section 2-705).
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods
on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand
19621
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made within ten days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of
solvency has been made to the particular seller in writing within
three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply.
Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right
to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresenta-
tion of solvency or of intent to pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject
to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith
purchaser or lien creditor under this Article (Section 2-403). Suc-
cessful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect
to them.
The right of the seller to refuse to part with his goods until
he is assured of payment as provided in this section is similar to
but broader than the general seller's lien as presently recognized
in West Virginia. 33 1 Here, where the buyer is insolvent, the seller
may not only refuse to deliver save for cash payment on the current
shipment, but may also refuse to deliver until he is paid for goods
"theretofore delivered under the contract."
The right of the seller to reclaim goods by making a demand
for them within ten days after their receipt by the buyer, when the
buyer received them while insolvent, is new. Present law does not
permit a seller to reclaim property merely because the buyer receives
it when he is insolvent. The seller's right to retain rather than regain
possession of goods sold is provided by the seller's lien and the right
to stop in transit. But such security is lost by the buyer's taking
possession of such goods. 32 The theory of the Code provision is
that the receipt by the buyer when he is insolvent is a "tacit business
misrepresentation." '333 The short time period during which the seller
must act prevents wholesale reclamations upon the insolvency of
a buyer.
Section 2-703. Seller's Remedies in General.
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of
goods or fails to make a payment due on or before delivery or
331 Rine & Lynch v. Ireland Lumber Co., 86 W. Va. 114, 103 S.E. 452
(1920); Curtin v. Isaacsen, 36 W. Va. 391, 15 S.E. 125 (1892); Williams v.
Gillespie, 30 W. Va. 586, 5 S.E. 219 (1888).
332 Ibid.
333 U.C.C. § 2-702, Comment 2.
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repudiates with respect to a part or the whole, then with respect
to any goods directly affected and, if the breach is of the whole
contract (Section 2-612), then also with respect to the whole un-
delivered balance the aggrieved seller may
(a) withhold delivery of such goods;
(b) stop delivery by any bailee as hereafter provided (Sec-
tion 2-705);
(c) proceed under the next section respecting goods still
unidentified to the contract;
(d) resell and recover damages as hereafter provided (Sec-
tion 2-706);
(e) recover damages for non-acceptance (Section 2-708)
or in a proper case the price (Section 2-709);
(f) cancel.
West Virginia has no comparable statutory index of seller's
remedies. The general theory of the section is that a seller is not
bound to elect one remedy only but may, as the facts justify, employ
a combination of remedies.
Section 2-704. Seller's Right to Identify Goods to the Contract
Notwithstanding Breach or to Salvage Unfinished
Goods.
(1) An aggrieved seller under the preceding section may
(a) identify to the contract conforming goods not already
identified if at the time he learned of the breach they
are in his possession or control;
(b) treat as the subject of resale goods which have demon-
strably been intended for the particular contract even
though those goods are unfinise.-
(2) Where the goods are unfinished an aggrieved seller may
in the exercise of reasonable commercial judgment for the purposes
of avoiding loss and of effective realization either complete the
manufacture and wholly identify the goods to the contract or cease
1962 ]
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manufacture and resell for scrap or salvage value or proceed in
any other reasonable manner.
This section is intended generally to liberalize the remedies
available to a seller where there is a repudiation of a contract of
sale which remains completely or partly unperformed. Subsection
(1) (a) seems to change existing law in this state though the precise
point covered by the section has not been raised. 34 Resale of
goods "tendered" or "appropriated" has been permitted to fix the
measure of damages arising from the buyer's breach,3 5 but it is
doubtful under existing law whether goods can be identified or
segregated after a repudiation by the buyer to lay the foundation
for the seller's resale.
Subsection (2) is concerned generally with the situation of a
repudiation while goods are in the process of manufacture and per-
mits the seller substantial freedom in proceeding with the work or
scrapping it. While no West Virginia authority is found dealing
specifically with this point, general reflections on the doctrine of
mitigation seem substantially in accord with that of the Code pro-
vision. 3 '6 The principal thrust of the Code position is that the seller
should be permitted to act in good faith by reasonable commercial
standards.
Section 2-705. Seller's Stoppage of Delivery in Transit or Other-
wise.
(1) The seller may stop delivery of goods in the possession of
a carrier or other bailee when he discovers the buyer to be insolvent
3 34 In Bennett & Hester v. Dayton, 102 W. Va. 197, 135 S.E. 13 (1926)
the seller loaded and shipped seven carloads of crushed stone after buyer
repudiated the contract of sale. The court held the seller could not base
its damages on the difference between the net return on the stone sold from
athe point of destination and the contract price. The court emphasized the
futility of the added transportation costs, which of course is a significant
element the sale of a commodity such as crushed stone. What the court would
have held had the goods been loaded and resold direct from seller's plant
is open to speculation. In Fayette-Kanawha Coal Co. v. Lake & Export Coal
Corp., 91 W. Va. 132, 112 S.E. 222 (1922) the buyer repudiated and the
seller was allowed to base his recovery in part on the resale of coal "already
mined and on hand:'
335 Queen v. Kenova Hardwood Flooring Co., 114 W. Va. 623, 173
S.E. 559 (1934); Emerson Shoe Co. v. Neely, 99 W. Va. 657, 129 S.E.
718 (1925).336 See generally, 5 MicmE, Junis., Damages §§ 16, 17.
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(Section 2-702) and may stop delivery of carload, truckload, plane-
load or larger shipments of express or freight when the buyer
repudiates or fails to make a payment due before delivery or if for
any other reason the seller has a right to withhold or reclaim the
goods.
(2) As against such buyer the seller may stop delivery until
(a) receipt of the goods by the buyer; or
(b) acknowledgment to the buyer by any bailee of the
goods except a carrier that the bailee holds the goods
for the buyer; or
(c) such aclnowledgment to the buyer by a carrier by re-
shipment or as warehouseman; or
(d) negotiation to the buyer of any negotiable document of
title covering the goods.
(3) (a) To stop delivery the seller must so notify as to enable
the bailee by reasonable diligence to prevent delivery
of the goods.
(b) After such notification the bailee must hold and deliver
the goods according to the directions of the seller but
the seller is liable to the bailee for any ensuing charges
or damages.
(c) If a negotiable document of title has been issued for
goods the bailee is not obliged to obey a notification to
stop until surrender of the document.
(d) A carrier who has issued a non-negotiable bill of lading
is not obliged to obey a notification to stop received
from a person other than the consignor.
West Virginia has recognized the right to stop in transit, but
the Code provision would broaden the seller's rights in this re-
gard.""7 The right is expanded so far as stoppage when goods are
held by a bailee,338 and also where stoppage is permitted for reasons
other than insolvency.
11 Sharp v. Campbell, 89 W. Va. 526, 109 S.E. 611 (1921).
338 There is some doubt under present law that goods in the hands of a
warehouseman or other bailee can be "stopped in transit." See, 3 WILLISTON,
SALBS § 524 (rev. ed. 1948); VOLD, SALns § 45 (2d ed. 1959).
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Section 2-706. Seller's Resale Including Contract for Resale.
(1) Under the conditions stated in Section 2-703 on seller's
remedies, the seller may resell the goods concerned or the undelivered
balance thereof. Where the resale is made in good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner the seller may recover the difference
between the resale price and the contract price together with any
incidental damages allowed under the provisions of this Article
(Section 2-710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's
breach.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) or unless
otherwise agreed resale may be at public or private sale including
sale by way of one or more contracts to sell or of identification to
an existing contract of the seller. Sale may be as a unit or in parcels
and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the
sale including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be
commercially reasonable. The resale must be reasonably identified
as referring to the broken contract, but it is not necessary that the
goods be in existence or that any or all of them have been identified
to the contract before the breach.
(3) Where the resale is at private sale the seller must give the
buyer reasonable notification of his intention to resell.
(4) Where the resale is at public sale
(a) only identified goods can be sold except where there is
a recognized market for a public sale of futures in goods
of the kind; and
(b) it must be made at a usual place or market for public
sale if one is reasonably available and except in the
case of goods which are perishable or threaten to de-
cline in value speedily the seller must give the buyer
reasonable notice of the time and place of the resale;
and
(c) if the goods are not to be within the view of those at-
tending the sale the notification of sale must state the
place where the goods are located and provide for their
reasonable inspection by prospective bidders; and
(d) the seller may buy.
(5) A purchaser who buys in good faith at a resale takes the
goods free of any rights of the original buyer even though the
[Vol. 64
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seller fails to comply with one or more of the requirements of this
section.
(6) The seller is not accountable to the buyer for any profit
made on any resale. A person in the position of a seller (Section
2-707) or a buyer who has rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked
acceptance must account for any excess over the amount of his
security interest, as hereinafter defined (subsection (3) of Section
2-711).
West Virginia law has recognized the seller's right of resale
generally,33 9 and to the degree that any detail has been added to
this general proposition, it is compatible with the Code provision.34
Notice however that the right of resale is expanded to include goods
identified to the contract after the buyers repudiation consistent with
section 2-704. In this respect, the Code provision grants an addi-
tional remedy to the aggrieved seller.
The principal aim of the Code provision is to permit the seller
to act in a commercially reasonable way and avoid too rigid or
technical rules for the resale.34 ' Thus, private or public sale is
authorized, so long as the method employed is commercially rea-
sonable.
Section 2-707. 'Terson in the Position of a Seller".
(1) A "person in the position of a seller" includes as against
a principal an agent who has paid or become responsible for the
price of goods on behalf of his principal or anyone who otherwise
holds a security interest or other right in goods similar to that of a
seller.
(2) A person in the position of a seller may as provided in this
Article withold or stop delivery (Section 2-705) and resell (Section
2-706) and recover incidental damages (Section 2-710).
339 Queen v. Kenova Hardwood Flooring Co., 114 W. Va. 623, 173 S.E.
559 (1934); Bennett & Hester v. Dayton, 102 W. Va. 197, 135 S.E. 13 (1926);
Emerson Shoe Co. v. Neely, 99 W. Va. 657, 129 S.E. 718 (1925); Fayette-
Kanawha Coal Co. v. Lake & Export Coal Corp., 91 W. Va. 132, 112 S.E.
222 (1922).340 See Queen v. Kenova Hardwood Flooring Co. and Bennett & Hester
v. Dayton, note 339 supra, which deal incidentally with the seller's right to
deduct reasonable costs involved in the resale from the amount recovered
on such sale.
341 See 3 WuLrisToN, SALEs §§ 543, 545-53 (rev. ed. 1948).
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West Virginia case law does not reveal any particular policy
of limiting the rights of third parties to sue upon or exercise other
remedies of the seller and his contract. Most of the usual situations
anticipated would fall within, so far as suit is concerned, the "direct
legal interest" necessary for a law action on the contract. 42
Section 2-708. Seller's Damages for Non-acceptance or Repudia-
tion.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this
Article with respect to proof of market price (Section 2-723), the
measure of damages for non-acceptance or repudiation by the buyer
is the difference between the market price at the time and place for
tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental
damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710) but less expenses
saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is
inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance
would have done then the measure of damages is the profit (in-
cluding reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made
from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental
damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for
costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds
of resale.
Subsection (1) states the standard contract measure of damages,
recognized in West Virginia,343 but makes this rule subject to sub-
section (2), the profit rule, where the latter would put the seller
closer to the position he would have enjoyed had there been no
breach. West Virginia has never ruled directly on the profit measure
of subsection (2) but case authority tends to point to this view as
acceptable in a proper case. 44 The Uniform Sales Act discouraged
342 See, Watson v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 107 W. Va. 367, 148 S.E.
322 (1929); Sims v. Carpenter, Frazier & Co., 68 W. Va. 223, 69 S.E. 794(1910).
343 Emerson Shoe Co. v- Neely, 99 W. Va. 657, 129 S.E. 718 (1925);
Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Lake & Export Coal Corp., 93 W. Va.
155, 116 S.E. 145 (1923).344 In Horn v. Bowen, 136 W. Va. 465, 67 S.E.2d 737 (1951) the court
referred to profit as a proper measure of damages in a case where plaintiff
subcontracted a land clearing operation and his profit was easily measured
by the difference in the amount he was to receive under his prime contract
and the amount he was to have paid under his subcontract.
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resort to profit as a measure345 and divergent lines of authority
developed under that act.3"6 The profit measure is peculiarly ap-
propriate and convenient in the sales of standard priced, mass pro-
duced items sold by dealers or merchants, such as automobiles,
appliances and the like. The parenthetical inclusion of overhead
costs is appropriate for those situations where the cost to a manu-
facturer makes up one half of the damage formula. In this, the
Code follows the view of a leading Pennsylvania case.347
Section 2-709. Action for the Price.
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price at it becomes due
the seller may recover, together with any incidental damages under
the next section, the price
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or
damaged within a commercially reasonable time after
risk of their loss has passed to the buyer; and
(b) of goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable
after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable
price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such
effort will be unavailing.
(2) Where the seller sues for the price he must hold for the
buyer any goods which have been identified to the contract and
are still in his control except that if resale becomes possible he may
resell them at any time prior to the collection of the judgment.
The net proceeds of any such resale must be credited to the buyer
and payment of the judgment entitles him to any goods not resold.
(3) After the buyer has wrongfully rejected or revoked accept-
ance of the goods or has failed to make a payment due or has
repudiated (Section 2-610), a seller who is held not entitled to the
price under this section shall nevertheless be awarded damages for
non-acceptance under the preceding section.
14tUnder Uniform Sales Act § 64 (3) the contract price less the
market price formula applied unless there was no "available market" or
"special circumstances" showed damages of a greater amount.
346See, Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 1011 (1952); McCO.MIcK, DAMAGES, §
173 (1935); AM. Jur., Sales § 616.347 Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 297 Pa. 483, 147
Ati. 519 (1929).
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Present West Virginia authority permits an action for price
only where title to the goods have passed to the buyer.34 This pro-
vision would expand the opportunities for the seller to bring an
action for the price under subsection (1) (b). Thus the combina-
tion of the seller's authority to identify goods to the contract after
repudiation by the buyer349 and a subsequent inability to resell at
a reasonable price would afford the aggrieved seller the opportunity
for an action for the price which does not presently exist.
Section 2-710. Seller's Incidental Damages.
Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commer-
cially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in
stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods
after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the
goods or otherwise resulting from the breach.
This provision generally restates existing West Virginia law.35
Section 2-711. Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Security
Interest in Rejected Goods.
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or
the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then
with respect to any goods involved, and with respect to the whole
if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2-612), the buyer
may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to
recovering so much of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to
all the goods affected whether or not they have been
identified to the contract; or
(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this
Article (Section 2-713).
(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer
may also
34 Acme Food Co. v. Older, 64 W. Va. 255, 61 S.E. 235 (1908).349 U.C.C. § 2-704.
35 Bennett & Hester v. Dayton, 102 W. Va. 197, 135 S.E. 13 (1926);
Allen v. Simmons, 90 W. Va. 774, 111 S.E. 838 (1922).
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(a) if the goods have been identified recover them as pro-
vided in this Article (Section 2-502); or
(b) in a proper case obtain specific performance or replevy
the goods as provided in this Article (Section 2-716).
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of accept-
ance a buyer has a security interest in goods in his possession or
control for any payments made on their price and any expenses
reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care
and custody and may hold such goods and resell them in like
manner as an aggrieved seller (Section 2-706).
This section generally lists the remedies available to a buyer
in much the same way that section 2-703 serves as an index to
seller's remedies. Save for the encouragement given to the buyer's
right to obtain specific goods which remain in the possession of a
defaulting seller, the Code provisions would effect no noticable
change in West Virginia law.
The buyer's security interest in rightfully rejected goods is dealt
with only in subsection (3) of the present provision, while other
remedies listed here are dealt with in more detail in the following
Code provisions. The buyer's right to a lien on rightfully rejected
goods is clearly inferrable under existing West Virginia law from
the case of Norman Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co."' In that
case the defendant buyer rightfully rejected a separable part of a
lumber shipment and sold it for the seller's account after the seller
claimed the lumber conformed to the contract. The court held that
the buyer acted properly in so doing. It should be noted that the
comments to this section point out that the buyer's lien upon such
goods extends affords security only for those items listed in the sub-
section, viz., advance payments on the price and expenses incurred
351 100 W. Va. 515, 131 S.E. 12 (1925). Compare: 'There seems to be
considerable uncertainty as to the buyer's right to retain possession until
the seller has repaid such payments as have been made by the buyer upon
the purchase price.... ." 46 AM. JuR., Sales § 670. The West Virginia case
cited involved a sale of lumber shipped from Kentucky to Philadelphia.
The court said the buyer may sell for the seller's account ex necessitate rel.,
viz., by reason of the necessity of the case. Query whether the same principle
would be applied if the seller demanded return of the goods at the point
of delivery while retaining a part of the purchase price. Under the Code
provision the buyer could retain possession to secure his cost of inspection.
1962 ]
34
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 3 [1962], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol64/iss3/3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
in inspection, resale and the like.352 The lien would not give a buyer
security for his general claim for damages for the seller's non-
performance. 353
Section 2-712. "Cover"; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods.
(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may
"cover" by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay
any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitu-
tion for those due from the seller.
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the
difference between the cost of cover and the contract price together
with any incidental or consequential damages as hereinafter defined
(Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the
seller's breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does
not bar him from any other remedy.
This section would do little more than provide a handy lable,
"cover," for a remedy presently existing in West Virginia law.
Several cases have made it clear that a buyer may obtain substitute
goods upon learning of the seller's default and that the buyer's
measure of damage in such case is the difference between the con-
tract price and the price of the replacement goods.354 One of these
cases, G. Elias & Brother v. Boone Timber Co.,3 5' specifically noted
the allowance of incidental damages in addition to the contract price,
replacement cost differential. Subsection (3) is included in the
present section to make it clear that while the buyer may seek
"cover" he is not obligated to do so, but may choose instead to
seek damages under the following section based on the difference
between the contract price and the market price. This view is
implicitly recognized in the West Virginia cases.
352 Apparently this was the only extent to which the buyer's interest
in the rejected goods was recognized in the Norman Lumber Case, note 351,
supra.353 U.C.C. § 2-711, Comment 2.354 Duquesne Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 90 W. Va. 673, 112
S.E. 219 (1922); Wood & Brooks Co. v. D. E. Hewit Lumber Co., 89 W. Va.
254, 109 S.E. 242 (1921); Hardman Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 86
W. Va. 404, 103 S.E. 282 (1920); G. Elias & Brother v. Boone Timber Co.,
85 W. Va. 508, 102 S.E. 488 (1920).
355 85 W. Va. 508, 102 S.E. 488.
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Section 2-713. Buyer's Damages for Non-Delivery or Repudiation.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to
proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages
for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between
the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach
and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential
damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses
save in consequence of the seller's breach.
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender
or, in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance,
as of the place of arrival.
This section states the standard contract rule of damages rec-
ognized in numerous West Virginia cases." 6
Section 2-714. Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted
Goods.
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification
(subsection (3) of Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for
any non-conformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary
course of events from the seller's breach as determined in any
manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value
of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they
had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate
damages of a different amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages
under the next section may also be recovered.
356 See, 16 MicHm, JulUs., Sales § 87. See also the authorities cited in
note 355, supra, for cases which hold that the difference between the contract
price and replacement cost is the proper measure of damages where the
buyer has in fact purchased replacement goods. These cases proceed on the
theory that the cost of the replacement is the best evidence of the market
price, where the buyer was reasonably diligent in obtaining such goods, and
thus grow out of the general rule of the present section.
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In general, this section restates present West Virginia law. The
buyer's right to damages for the seller's tender of goods which do
not conform to the seller's undertaking is normally treated as a set-
off against the purchase price for breach of warranty."' Subsection
(1) makes it clear that damages suffered by a buyer because of
non-conformity not properly considered a breach of warranty may
be treated similarly., 8
The incidental and consequential damages noted under sub-
section (3) and considered in more detail in the following section
have been held proper recoveries under West Virginia decisions."'
Section 2-715. Buyer's Incidental and Consequential Damages.
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach in-
clude expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transpor-
tation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any com-
merically reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection
with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to
the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach
include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular require-
ments and needs of which the seller at the time of con-
tracting had reason to know and which could not rea-
sonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty.
This section generally restates existing West Virginia law. In-
cidental damages referred to in subsection (1) were recognized as
357 See, e.g., Fou!ty v. Chalmax Sales Co., 99 W. Va. 300, 128 S.E. 389(1925); Southern Billiard Supply Co. v. Lopinsky, 93 W. Va. 214, 116 S.E.253 (1923); Gorby v. Bridgeman, 83 W. Va. 727, 99 S.E. 88 (1919).358 See U.C.C. § 2-714, Comment 2, which says subsection (1) is in-
tended to apply to "any failure of the seller to perform according to his
obligations under the contract. .. ."
"59 Hayssen Mfg. Co. v. Mootz, 116 W. Va. 204, 179 S.E. 301 (1935)(bakery operator allowed damages for bread rendered unsaleable by wrapping
machine which failed to wrap bread as warranted); Schaffner v. National
Supply Co., 80 W. Va. 111, 92 S.E. 580 (1917) (cost of new well allowed
where previous well made useless by seller's failure to supply casing as
warranted).
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appropriate recoveries in Norman Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg.
Co.36 which involved expenses incurred by the buyer in reselling
rightfully rejected goods. The kinds of expenses specifically listed
in subsection (1) set a general pattern and do not exhaust the list
of items for which a buyer may recover.36 ' The "other reasonable
expenses" phrase near the conclusion of this subsection indicates
clearly that expenses similar to those expressly listed may also be
recovered by the buyer.
Subsection (2) covers two similar kinds of damages which may
flow from a buyer's failure to perform or his inadequate perform-
ance. Subsection (2) (a) anticipates generally the foreseeable loss
resulting from seller's breach, such as buyer's loss of profits on an
anticipated resale. Franklin v. Pence accords with this view. 62 Sub-
section (2) (b) covers the "injury to person or property" situation
which on occasion may involve damages in substantial amounts.
This provision too is in accord with existing law in West Virginia.'63
The limiting factor here arises from the words "proximately result-
ing" and it is incumbent upon the plaintiff buyer to show the rela-
tionship between breach of warranty and the injury or loss com-
plained of. 64 A seller may limit his potential liabilities in certain
instances by contract. This subject is dealt with in section 2-719.
Section 2-716. Buyer's Right to Specific Performance or Replevin.
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are
unique or in other proper circumstances.
360 100 W. Va. 515, 131 S.E. 12 (1925). See also Gorby v. Bridgeman,
83 W. Va. 727, 99 S.E. 88 (1919).
361 U.C.C. § 2-715, Comment 1.
362 128 W. Va. 353, 36 S.E.2d 505 (1945).
363 Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market, 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785
(1939) (damages for illness and medical expenses indicated as proper in
suit based on breach of implied warranty of fitness of food); Hayssen Mfg.
Co. v. Mootz, 116 W. Va. 204, 179 S.E. 301 (1935) (loss of bread resulting
from inferior wrapping machine); Morgan Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. McDaniels
& Landis, 101 W. Va. 87, 131 S.E. 879 (1926) (losses on contract suffered
by builder resulting from supplier's furnishing of inferior materials); Schaffner
v. National Supply Co., 80 W. Va. 111, 92 S.E. 580 (1917); (loss of oil well
because of inferior easing supplied by seller).
364 In Morgan Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. McDaniels & Landis, note 363,
supra, the court noted that the losses occurring from use of inferior materials
after buyer knew or should have known of such conditions could not be
charged against the seller. In Schaffner v. National Supply Co., note 363,
supra, the buyer was excused for continued use inferior well casing after
he became suspect of its quality because seller insisted the casing was as
warranted and difficulties in its use resulted from buyer's improper use.
See, Silverman v. Swift & Co., 141 Conn. 450, 107 A.2d 277 (1954).
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(2) The decree for specific performance may include such
terms and conditions as to payment of the price, damages, or other
relief as the court may deem just.
(3) The buyer has a right of replevin for goods identified to
the contract if after reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover
for such goods or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such
effort will be unavailing or if the goods have been shipped under
reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in them has
been made or tendered.
The aim of this Code section is to "further a more liberal at-
titude than some courts have shown in connection with the specific
performance of contracts of sale." '365 The "attitude" of the proposed
section does not seem peculiarly at variance with the attitudes ex-
pressed by the rather rare West Virginia cases touching upon this
subject matter.
Elk Refining Co. v. Falling Rock Cannel Coal Co.,366 a case
involving the sale of natural gas, seems to be in full accord with
the provision. The buyer of the gas in that case, an industrial user,
was allowed specific relief because alternative sources of natural gas
were available only at substantial disadvantages. And in Morgan
v. Bartlett,36 a case involving a sale of corporate stock,368 the court
indicated that the "inability to duplicate [the] property in the market"
would afford a basis for granting specific performance.
The comments to the present section note that "output and
requirements contracts involving a particular or peculiarly available
source or market present today the typical commercial specific per-
formance situation .. ."""' These precise situations seem to be
anticipated by the current West Virginia decisions.
Section 2-717. Deduction of Damages From The Price.
The buyer on notifying the seller of his intention to do so
may deduct all or any part of the damages resulting from any
365 U.C.C. § 2-716, Comment 1.
36692 W. Va. 479, 115 S.E. 431 (1922).
367 75 W. Va. 293, 83 S.E. 1001 (1914).
368 The sales article of the Code does not apply to the sale of corporate
stock. Section 2-105 (1) specifically excludes investment securities from
the definition of "goods." Corporate securities are dealt with separately under
article 8.369 U.C.C. § 2-716, Comment 2.
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breach of the contract from any part of the price still due under
the same contract.
There is no West Virginia authority directly in point. Section
2-609 requires prompt notification of breach and this section re-
quires notice of the intention to withhold payment of the price,
which would be an additional notice. The apparent significance
of the present section is that a buyer's good faith notice of intention
to withhold part or all of the purchase price for a claimed breach
would not amount to a breach on the buyer's part which would
justify seller's cancellation of future performances remaining due.
The good faith requirement arises from the general part of the Code,
article 1, specifically section 1-203.
Section 2-718. Liquidation or Limitation of Damages; Deposits.
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in
the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the
difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or non-feasibility
of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unrea-
sonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
(2) Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods
because of the buyer's breach, the buyer is entitled to restitution of
any amount by which the sum of his payments exceeds
(a) the amount to which the seller is entitled by virtue of
terms liquidating the seller's damages in accordance
with subsection (1), or
(b) in the absence of such terms, twenty per cent of the
value of the total performance for which the buyer is
obligated under the contract or $500, whichever is
smaller.
(3) The buyer's right to restitution under subsection (2) is
subject to offset to the extent that the seller establishes
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of
this Article other than subsection (1), and
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the
buyer directly or indirectly by reason of the contract.
1962 ]
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(4) Where a seller has received payment in goods their rea-
sonable value or the proceeds of their resale shall be treated as
payments for the purposes of subsection (2); but if the seller has
notice of the buyer's breach before reselling goods received in part
performance, his resale is subject to the conditions laid down in
this Article on resale by an aggrieved seller (Section 2-706).
Subsection (1) states generally the accepted rule as to the en-
forceability of stipulated damage provisions in contracts generally.
In this, the section fairly reflects the existing law of West Virginia.""
Subsections (2), (3) and (4) proceed in more detail to deal
with problems not presently resolved under West Virginia law. There
has been some doubt as to the defaulting buyer's right to recover
advances made to a seller in excess of any damage suffered by the
seller."' The Code adopts the view in subsection (2) that the
buyer may recover back such excess amounts and works out in some
detail in that subsection and those remaining the rules by which the
amount of this recovery shall be determined.
Section 2-719. Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy.
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this
section and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation
of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to
or in substitution for those provided in this Article and
may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable
under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies
to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to
repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or
parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the
remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which
case it is the sole remedy.
1
7 0 Wiggin v. Marsh Lumber Co., 77 W. Va. 7, 87 S.E. 194 (1915);
Charleston Lumber Co. v. Friedman, 64 W. Va. 151, 61 S.E. 815 (1908).
See Beury v. Gay, 73 W. Va. 460, 81 S.E. 842 (1914).371 See an enlightened discussion of the problem in Amtorg Trading
Corp. v. Miehlo Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953).
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(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy
to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided
in this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless
the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of con-
sequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages
where the loss is commercial is not.
The present section gives some general guidance in this very
difficult area but leaves much to the discretion of the courts. Existing
West Virginia authority on this point is meager and inconclusive.
Hill & Gain v. Montgomery Ward Co.3 72 is the only case found
decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals touching
upon the limitation of remedy in connection with the sale of per-
sonal property." 3 There a refrigerator was sold to the buyer with
a "guarantee" of satisfaction or the buyer could have back his money.
The court viewed this as a valid limitation of remedy when the buyer
sued to recover the value of the refrigerator and for damages re-
sulting from a fire originating in that apparatus. Subsection (1)
(a) seems to agree that this is a valid limitation of remedy.
Subsection (3) uses the term "unconscionable" to describe
limitations of remedy which shall not be enforced. This leaves the
door open for the courts to determine the appropriateness of the
limitation in the light of all the circumstances of the case. The cross
referencing in the official edition of the Code points to the general
section on unconscionable provisions, section 2-302, which makes
it clear that determinations of unconscionability are for the judge and
not the jury, and no doubt that policy would apply in this instance
also.
372 121 W. Va. 554, 4 S.E.2d 793 (1939).
373 Compare, Dunham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 85 W. Va. 425, 102
S.E. 113 (1920) (limitation of liability upon sending telegram held reason-
able and valid); Fielder & Turley v. Adams Express Co., 69 W. Va. 138, 71
S.E. 99 (1911) (carriers liability limited to agreed valuation held valid).
See also, Maryland Cas. Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 116 F. Supp. 122(S.D. W. Va. 1953) (Suit by subrogee of Virginia buyer against Ohio man-
ufacturer-seller, holding disclaimer of warranty valid, apparently applying
Ohio law, and disclaimer of negligence liability valid also as applied in the
instant case).
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It should be noted that this provision deals only with the
limitation of the remedy once the warranty has been established,
where the theory of recovery is a breach of warranty. It is possible,
in addition, for the seller to effectively disclaim all warranties com-
pletely.37
4
Section 2-720. Effect of "Cancellation" or "Rescission" on Claims
for Antecedent Breach.
Unless the contrary intention clearly appears, expressions of
"cancellation" or "rescission" of the contract or the like shall not
be construed as a renunciation or discharge of any claim in damages
for an antecedent breach.
The section is perhaps a bit hypercautious, but in view of oc-
casional strained opinions its presence is at least justifiable.171 In
general accord is Wiggin v. Marsh Lumber Co.,376 where a question
of waiver was directly concerned. There it was held that a buyer's
reluctant extension of time for performance did not waive its right
to recover reasonable liquidated damages under the terms of the
original contract.
Section 2-721. Remedies for Fraud.
Remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud includes all
remedies available under this Article for non-fraudulent breach.
Neither rescission or a claim for rescission of the contract for
sale nor rejection or return of the goods shall bar or be deemed
inconsistent with a claim for damages or other remedy.
There is no direct West Virginia authority dealing with the
proposition advanced by this provision. There is a mass of case
law generally on the question of "election of remedies" generally 377
but none of this has been focused on sales situations in West Virginia.
See U.C.C. § 2-316.375 See the toying with the "recission" phrase in American Sugar Re-
fining Co. v. Martin-Neely Grocery Co., 90 W. Va. 730, 111 S.E. 759 (1922).
376 77 W. Va. 7, 87 S.E. 194 (1915).37 See generally, note, 120 A.L.R. 1154 (1939).
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The point of the Code provision is clear and seems quite fair. The
kind of damages anticipated by this section would include conse-
quential damages, such as those suffered by a merchant resulting
from his sale of inferior merchandise to regular customers, as al-
lowed in American Pure Foods Co. v. Elliott,' a North Carolina
case, and such incidental damages as costs incurred in testing and
returning goods, as allowed in the Alabama case of Caffey v. Alabama
Mach. & Supply Co. 7 '
Section 2-722. Who Can Sue Third Parties for Injury to Goods.
Where a third party so deals with goods which have been
identified to a contract for sale as to cause actionable injury to
a party to that contract
(a) a right of action against the third party is in either
party to the contract for sale who has title to or a secu-
rity interest or a special property or an insurable inter-
est in the goods; and if the goods have been destroyed
or converted a right of action is also in the party who
either bore the risk of loss under the contract for sale
or has since the injury assumed that risk as against
the other;
(b) if at the time of the injury the party plaintiff did not
bear the risk of loss as against the other party to the
contract for sale and there is no arrangement between
them for disposition of the recovery, his suit or settle-
ment is, subject to his own interest, as a fiduciary for
the other party to the contract;
(e) either party may with the consent of the other sue
for the benefit of whom it may concern.
No West Virginia authority on this particular question is found.
The provision is a form of a real party in interest statute"80 applicable
to goods in the process of sale and can serve to avoid problems
which might otherwise arise from the Code's abandonment of the
title concept.
378 151 N.C. 393, 66 S.E. 451 (1909).
379 19 Ala. App. 189, 96 So. 454 (1922).3 8 0 W. VA. CODE, ch. 55, art. 8, § 9 (Michie 1961).
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Section 2-723. Proof of Market Price: Time and Place.
(1) If an action based on anticipatory repudiation comes to
trial before the time for performance with respect to some or
all of the goods, any damages based on market price (Section 2-708
or Section 2-713) shall be determined according to the price of such
goods prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party learned of
the repudiation.
(2) If evidence of a price prevailing at the time or places
described in this Article is not readily available the price prevailing
within any reasonable time before or after the time described or at
any other place which in commercial judgment or under usage of
trade would serve as a reasonable substitute for the one described
may be used, making any proper allowance for the cost of trans-
porting the goods to or from such other place.
(3) Evidence of a relevant price prevailing at a time or place
other than the one described in this Article offered by one party
is not admissible unless and until he has given the other party such
notice as the court finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise.
Reiser v. Lawrenceis in accord with the general purpose of
this section. 81 In the Reiser case, the West Virginia court held that
it was proper to prove market price at the place of delivery by
reference to the price in another market upon a showing that the
price at the point of delivery was regularly determined by reference
to the other market. (Pittsburgh oil price based on Oklahoma
prices.) The Code section is aimed at giving the court substantial
leeway in admitting evidence to establish a market price.
Section 2-724. Admissibility of Market Quotations.
Whenever the prevailing price or value of any goods regularly
bought and sold in any established commodity market is in issue,
reports in official publications or trade journals or in newspapers
or periodicals of general circulation published as the reports of
such market shall be admissible in evidence. The circumstances
of the preparation of such a report may be shown to affect its weight
but not its admissibility.
381 96 W. Va. 82, 123 S.E. 451 (1924).
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No West Virginia authority is found on the point. One Virginia
decision in 1899 however held inadmissible testimony of a witness
as to market prices based upon his reading of market reports pub-
lished in a newspaper of general circulation." The Code provision
does not reach this question," 3 but only deals with the admissibility
of the report itself.'84
Section 2-725. Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale.
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued.
By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of
limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regard-
less of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A
breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except
that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of
the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such
performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should
have been discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by
subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by
another action for the same breach such other action may be com-
menced after the expiration of the time limited and within six
months after the termination of the first action unless the termination
resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure
or neglect to prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute
of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued
before this Act becomes effective.
The Code provision would shorten the time in which an action
on contract could be commenced. Presently, actions on written con-
tracts may be started ten years after the cause arose, and actions
382 Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Reeves, 97 Va. 284, 33 S.E. 606 (1899).
311 See a note on the distinction between testimony as to market price
based on market reports and the admission of the reports themselves in 45
MicH. L. Rnv. 748 (1947).3 84 Cf., 6 WiGMORE, EviDENCE § 1704 (3d ed. 1940).
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on oral contracts would be timely if commenced within five years."'
The Code limitation on sales actions makes no distinction between
oral and written contracts of sale. One of the moving considerations
underlying the adoption of the relatively short period was to reduce
the record keeping requirements of business concerns.386
Insurance law provides the only parallel found in existing West
Virginia law for the concluding portion of subjection (1) dealing
with the authority of the parties to alter the statute of limitations
by contract. An early case held enforceable a clause in an insurance
contract which required the action to be commenced within six
months.38 The Insurance Code now prohibits contract reductions
of the period below a minimum of two years for most kinds of in-
surance contracts, 88 but no clear authority is found on this question
in other types of contracts.
Subsections (3) and (4) pose a bit of a problem when com-
pared to present West Virginia Law. Subsection (3) permits a
new action to be commenced with six months where the termination
of the original suit would "leave available a remedy by another
action on the same breach. . . ." A similar provision in the present
West Virginia Code, not limited to sales contract actions, of course,
permits a new action to be brought within one year where the original
action was dismissed "by reason of a cause which could not be plead
[sic] in bar of an action or suit. .. ."39 The provisions are essential-
ly overlapping. The Code provision would require the new action
within a shorter period where the cause arose out of a sale of goods
transaction. Subsection (4) could plausibly be argued as effectively
overruling the six months limitation of subsection (3). The argu-
ment could proceed on this line: Subsection (4) of the Code pro-
vision saves all "tolling" statutes and the present statute in West
Virginia permitting a new action within one year after a "non-merit"
termination of the prior suit may properly be considered a "tolling"
statute. The better interpretation here would be that the saving
provision of the present West Virginia statutes is not a "tolling"
statute in the sense of subsection (4) of the Commercial Code pro-
vision and that the six-month saving provision of the Code, subsec-
3 85 W. VA. CODE, ch. 55, art. 2, § 6 (Michie 1961).86 U.C.C. § 2-725, Comment 1.
38 7 McFarland & Steel v. Aetna Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 6 W. Va. 437
(1873).3 85W. VA. CODE, ch. 33, art. 6 § 14 (Michie 1961).
389 W. VA. CODE, ch. 55, art. 8, § 18 (Michie 1961).
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tion (3), should be applicable to sales of goods transactions. This
admitted creates a unique rule for sales transactions, but the sales
article as a whole changes a number of general rules as they apply
to sales transactions, parole evidence, identity of offer and acceptance,
etc. The alternative would be to delete subsection (3) from the
present section and rely on the existing statute provision in West
Virginia. This would have the disadvantage of making the Code
non-uniform in West Virginia.
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